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JURISDICTION TO EXPROPRIATE AND THE SHELL
GAME OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS
As nations have become more interdependent both culturally
and economically their citizens' interests have transcended national
boundaries. The ability of a sovereign State to prescribe and enforce
laws to regulate this activity within its borders has become a basic
tenet of international law.' However, limitations do exist on a State's
power to enforce laws beyond its borders because it requires a will-
ingness on the part of other sovereigns to respect those laws.2
This conflict reaches an extreme when a State attempts to expro-
priate or nationalize property. The expropriation of tangible business
or personal property is the easiest form to call to mind. Pictures of
armed militia seizing factories or other businesses are familiar.
When a sovereign attempts to seize bank accounts, patents, trade-
marks or other intangible property, the issues become significantly
more complex.3 The difficulty revolves around the determination of
where these intangibles are located and who has jurisdiction over
them.
Cases litigated in the United States involving foreign national-
izations generally invoke the act of state doctrine, which means that
courts "will not examine the validity of a taking of property within
its own territory by a sovereign government."4 The threshold ques-
tion which courts must address when confronted with these confisca-
tion cases is where the property was located when the foreign
sovereign attempted to exercise jurisdiction. This question is rela-
tively mechanical when applied to tangible real or personal property.
The difficulty arises when the confiscation involves intangible prop-
erty which cannot be readily located.5 If the property is determined
1. "Oppenhiem correctly held that the independence of a State as well as its territorial
and personal supremacy (supreme authority in its territory and over its citizens, both at home
and abroad) were not rights at all but were recognized and protected qualities or characteristics
of states as international persons." G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 126 (1970).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 9 (1965).
3. Intangible property is property as has no intrinsic or marketable value but is merely
the representative or evidence of value, such as certificates of stock, bonds, promissory notes
and franchises. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 726 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
4. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
5. One author has gone so far as to say, "the question of the situs of true intangibles may
not be capable of answer at all, and yet intangibles exist and may have value, including value in
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to have been beyond the reach of the expropriating sovereign, courts
in the United States do not consider themselves bound to honor the
action and are free to apply otherwise applicable law.6
The results of a decision as to where intangibles are located were
illustrated by two recent cases brought against Chase Manhattan
Bank (Chase) by parties seeking to recover on certificates of deposit
obtained in Cuba during 1958 and 1959.' Chase denied liability in
both cases, claiming the accounts had been seized by the government
of Fidel Castro in 1959.8 In 1984 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, in Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, held that
the seizure did not relieve Chase of its obligation to the depositor.9
The court held that the act of state doctrine did not preclude such an
examination.'0 However, that same year, the Court of Appeals of
New York, in Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, ruled that the seizure
was not subject to question. In Perez the court held that the act of
state doctrine did preclude the court from examining the actions of
the Cuban government." These conflicting conclusions on virtually
identical facts raise new doubts about the viability of traditional anal-
ysis used in cases of expropriation and intangible property.
This Comment will examine the act of state doctrine as it is ap-
plied to the expropriation of intangible property and whether it
should have been applied in Garcia and Perez. To make that deter-
mination, the method used to establish the location of the certificates
a law suit." Lowenfeld, In Search of the Intangible: A Comment on Shaffer v. Heitner, 53
N.Y.U. L. REV. 102, 108 (1978).
6. "The act of state doctrine.., is a judicially accepted limitation on the normal adjudi-
cative processes of the courts, springing from the thoroughly sound principle that on occasion
individual litigants may have to forgo decision on the merits of their claims .... First Na-
tional City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 769 (1972).
7. Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984); and Perez v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 463 N.E.2d 5, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 366 (1984).
8. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 649; and Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 465, 463 N.E.2d at 6, 474 N.Y.S.2d
at 690.
9. The circuit court affirmed the lower court judgment of Vincent L. Broderick, J., of the
Southern District of New York in favor of Garcia and appealed by Chase. Garcia, 735 F.2d at
645.
10. "Chase's debt to Dominguez and Garcia was not extinguished merely because it was
forced to pay an equivalent sum of money to a third party." Garcia, 735 F.2d at 649. The
court continues: "Chase cannot use the act of state doctrine as a defense because the doctrine is
not implicated here." Id. at 651.
11. "Chase's debt to Manas was payable in Cuba, giving Cuba jurisdiction to collect and
enforce it, which the Cuban government exercised. By reason of the act of state doctrine the
legitimacy of the confiscation is beyond our review." Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 470, 463 N.E.2d at 9,
474 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
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will be explained. Initially this Comment will present the factual
background of the two cases in order to illustrate the application of
the act of state doctrine in expropriation cases. The focus will then
narrow to consider intangibles and the methods used to determine
their situs. A discussion of several alternatives for the debtor situs
rule will follow. This analysis will conclude that the traditional
debtor situs rule should be abandoned and propose that a creditor
situs rule would best suit the dictates of the act of state doctrine.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Juanita Gonzalez Garcia and her husband Jose Lorenzo Perez
Dominguez, a wealthy businessman and former government official,
visited Chase's Vedado branch in Cuba on March 10, 1958, and ob-
tained a non-negotiable certificate of deposit worth 100,000 pesos.
Dominguez and Garcia returned in September and converted an ad-
ditional 400,000 pesos into dollar denominated certificates of deposit.
In late 1958 the certificates were sent to Garcia's cousin in Spain for
safekeeping. 12
In the same fashion Rosa Manas y Pineiro (Manas), the wife of a
cabinet minister, purchased five non-negotiable certificates of deposit
between May and December, 1958. The certificates of deposit were
obtained at Chase's Marianao, Cuba branch and had a total value of
$227,336.47. 13
When Fidel Castro assumed control of the Cuban government
on January 1, 1959, Sefiores Dominguez and Manas took refuge in
embassies and soon left Cuba. 4 Manas herself remained in Cuba for
the first half of 1959 and she returned for four months in 1960.15
Garcia did not leave Cuba until 1964.16
In February 1959 the new Cuban government enacted Law No.
78, which created the Ministry of Recovery of Misappropriated
Property (Ministry).' 7 The Ministry was empowered to conduct in-
12. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 646-47.
13. Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 465, 463 N.E.2d at 6, 74 N.Y.S.2d at 690.
14. Dominguez took refuge in the Salvadorian embassy. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 647. Manas'
husband took refuge in the Colombian embassy. Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 466, 463 N.E.2d at 6, 474
N.Y.S.2d at 690.
15. Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 466, 463 N.E.2d at 6, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 690.
16. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 647.
17. A series of laws were issued beginning in February, 1959, which authorized the gov-
ernment to confiscate all property of former Batista collaborators. The laws covered most
government officials since Batista took power in 1952 as well as members of the Supreme
Court, president of the national bank and prominent members of industry, commerce, labor
3
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vestigations, freeze bank accounts, take possession of property, and
enact "final decisions" which returned the confiscated property to the
"national wealth."' 8
The Ministry ordered Chase to freeze the accounts of Garcia
and Dominquez as well as those of Manas. On July 16, 1959, the
Ministry ordered the Garcia account closed. Chase complied by re-
mitting a sum equal to their deposits. t9 In September 1959, the Min-
istry ordered the Manas account closed. Funds in the amount of the
certificates of deposit were remitted to the Cuban government.20
Chase's Cuban branches were nationalized in 1960 and the Banco
Nacional de Cuba assumed control of the accounts and facilities.2 '
The decisions of the United States Second Circuit in Garcia and
the New York Court of Appeals in Perez are based on wholly differ-
ent principles which have been applied to very similar facts. The
Second Circuit in Garcia held that "if the situs of Chase's debt to
Garcia were in Cuba, the Cuban government could validly seize it,"22
but that Chase's debt was not extinguished simply because it paid the
Cuban government. The court concluded that Chase had a contrac-
and the professions on a 100 person committee created by Batista. See M. GORDON, THE
CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 72-73 (1976).
18. A translation from Spanish of Cuban Law No. 78 provides in part:
CHAPTER 1
The Ministry and Its Jurisdiction Article 1. The Ministry of Recovery of Misap-
propriated Property is the proper organization of the Executive Power intended to
recover property of any type which has been removed from the National Wealth and
obtain the complete restoration of the proceeds of unjust enrichments obtained under
cover of the Public Power and so to the detriment of said wealth.
Article 5. The Minister shall decree the precautionary measures which may be nec-
essary in order to assure the purpose pursued by this law, and particularly the follow-
ing:
a) The freezing of bank accounts, the sealing and opening of safe deposit boxes
in banks or in other private institutions.
Garcia, 735 F.2d at 647 n. I.
19. Id.
20. Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 466, 463 N.E.2d at 7, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 691. Given the precarious
position of United States business interests in Cuba following Castro's assumption of power,
Chase appears to have had no opportunity to challenge the order. Any denial would, most
likely, have been followed by a physical seizure of the assets or some other retaliatory response.
This view is reinforced by the fact that the banks were ultimately subjected to the presence of
armed militia to ensure compliance and prevent United States managers from leaving.
GORDON, supra note 17, at 102.
21. When the three American owned banks, First National City Bank of New York, the
First National Bank of Boston and the Chase Manhattan Bank, were nationalized, the net
assets were over $35,000,000. The implementing resolution linked the nationalization to the
"cowardly and criminal economic aggression" committed by the government of the United
States. GORDON, supra note 17, at 102-03.
22. Garcia, 735 F.2d at 650.
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tual obligation to pay Garcia because the money had been deposited
with the danger of seizure in the minds of both parties.2"
The New York Court of Appeals in Perez ignored any possible
contractual obligation and based its decision on the presence of the
debtor, Chase, in Cuba which gave the government enforcement
power under the reasoning of Harris v. Balk.24 From that point then
the confiscation was the act of a foreign sovereign within its territory
and thus was beyond review under the act of state doctrine.25
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The act of state doctrine requires that courts in the United
States not hear cases which would require a questioning of the valid-
ity of an act of another government, in its capacity as sovereign,
within its own territory. 26 The act of state doctrine originated in sev-
enteenth century England 27 and was recognized in the United States
with Underhill v. Hernandez2 in 1897.
The act of state doctrine was first thought to be based on respect
for foreign sovereignty. 29 The United States Supreme Court aban-
23. Id.
24. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). Simply stated, the rule is that an action can be maintained
against a party by an action against the party's debtor. A court's jurisdiction is based on its
authority over the debtor and the debtor's location within the territory. For a more detailed
discussion of the rule and its implications see infra notes 76-102 and accompanying text.
25. Perez, 61 N.Y.2d at 473, 463 N.E.2d at 11, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 695. Manas instituted this
action in July 1974 by motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint in the Supreme
Court special term of New York County. Chase also moved for summary judgment. The court
denied the motions for summary judgment and for dismissal finding that issues of fact were
raised by omissions in the certificates of deposit and the Manas' status vis-a-vis the Cuban
government when the accounts were expropriated. This was affirmed by the Appellate Divi-
sion in Manas y Pineiro v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 383 N.Y.S.2d 357, 52 A.D.2d 794
(1976). When Chase subsequently sought to remove the case to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, the court held that litigation of the motion for
summary judgment in the state courts deprived the bank of its right to remove the case to
federal court and remanded. Manas y Pineiro v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 443 F. Supp.
418 (1978).
26. Mathias, Restructuring the Act of State Doctrine: A Blueprint for Legislative Reform,
12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 369 (1980).
27. Courts in the United States generally refer to Blad v. Bamfield, 3 Swans. 604 (App.),
36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch. 1674) as the source of the act of state doctrine. Mathias, supra note 26,
at 370 n.6.
28. 168 U.S. 250 (1897). The Supreme Court first stated the doctrine as follows: "Every
sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the act of another government done within its
own territory." Id. at 252.
29. Mathias, supra note 26, at 372-73.
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doned this view in 1964, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.3°
In Sabbatino, Justice Harlan wrote that the source of the doctrine
was the need to maintain the separation of powers and allow only the
Executive Branch to conduct foreign policy.3" Justice Harlan cited
several reasons for the judiciary remaining outside such disputes in-
cluding the following: first, the greater resources of the Executive to
investigate and negotiate; 32 second, the chance that judicial interven-
tion would conflict with and embarrass the Executive; and third, that
certain titles might become uncertain in foreign commerce.33
However the Sabbatino opinion did not completely foreclose ju-
dicial involvement in cases involving act of state issues. The Supreme
Court qualified its holding slightly by stating:
[W]e decide only that the judicial Branch will not examine the
validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a for-
eign sovereign government, extant and recognized by this country
at the time of suit, in the absence of treaty or other unambiguous
agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the com-
plaint alleges that the taking violates international law.34
Several factors were outlined in the opinion which might lead
courts in the United States to examine the legality of foreign acts
despite the act of state doctrine. These factors include: 1) the degree
of codification and consensus concerning the area of international
law involved; 2) the relative weight or sensitivity of the issues in the
international community; and 3) the subsequent dissolution of the
foreign government.35 In the absence of these conditions, a court
must defer to the Executive.
Dissatisfaction with the act of state doctrine arose soon after
Sabbatino and was based on a feeling of helplessness experienced
when United States courts refused to hear cases which violated
widely accepted standards of international law simply because a for-
30. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
31. The act of state doctrine does, however, have "constitutional" underpinnings. It
arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of
separation of powers .... The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the
strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the
validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit
of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the interna-
tional sphere.
Id. at 423.
32. Id. at 431-34.
33. Id.
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eign sovereign was a party to the litigation.36 In response to dissatis-
faction with the results of applying the doctrine, both the courts and
Congress created several devices for circumventing the act of state
doctrine.37 The congressional response was contained in what has
been referred to as the Sabbatino or Second Hickenlooper Amend-
ment.3" The amendment prohibits courts from invoking the act of
state doctrine where the confiscation violated international law.39
The exceptions created by the courts to avoid applying the act of
state doctrine have been more varied and fall into three groups which
parallel the exceptions to the sovereign immunity doctrine. These
include: 1) the doctrine need not be applied where a letter from the
Executive indicates that United States foreign policy would not be
endangered;' 2) the doctrine need not be applied where the foreign
government's acts are substantially commercial rather than public in
nature;4 and 3) the doctrine need not be applied to prevent counter-
36. [T]he act of state doctrine prompts automatic judicial reflexes that relegate all
disputes involving foreign governments and international law to an unspecified-or
nonexistent-forum outside the courtroom. Judicial circumspection and care as to
questions of United States foreign policy and limitations on judicial power in matters
touching on foreign affairs seem to have become synonymous with unquestioning ju-
dicial abstention in cases alleging international law violations by foreign governments.
Mathias, supra note 26, at 371.
37. See generally Comment, The Act of State Doctrine: A History of Judicial Limitations
and Exceptions, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 677 (1977).
38. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970).
39. The Amendment provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall de-
cline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the
merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of
title or other right to property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a
party claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or
other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of the state in violation of the principles
of international law, including the principles of compensation and the other standards
set out in this subsection: Provided, That this subparagraph shall not be applicable
(1) in any case in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to international law or
with respect to a claim of title or other right to property acquired pursuant to an
irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 180 days duration issued in good faith
prior to the time of the confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case with respect to
which the President determines that application of the act of state doctrine is required
in the particular case by the foreign policy interests of the United States and a sugges-
tion to this effect is filed on his behalf in the case with the court.
Id.
40. This procedure, known as the Bernstein exception, was developed in Bernstein v. N.
V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1954),
although its future is uncertain following the Supreme Court decision in First National City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). In these situations the Executive
Branch will convey to the court its determination that the foreign policy needs or aims of the
country would not be disturbed by the court's hearing the case. This method accommodates
the judicial concern not to interfere in foreign relations matters which are the constitutional
responsibility of the Executive.
41. The commercial exception was discussed in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Repub-
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claims where the expropriating nation has initially brought the issue
before a United States court.42
Courts have also developed one other method of avoiding the
application of the act of state doctrine by determining that the prop-
erty or interest expropriated was not located within the State's terri-
tory and hence there was no jurisdiction over the property.43 It is the
use of this final escape device which will be examined at length in
order to determine the viability of the Garcia and Perez decisions.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUS REQUIREMENT
The Supreme Court in Sabbatino made it clear that the act of
state doctrine is to be applied only where there is a taking of property
by a foreign sovereign "within its own territory."" The ability of a
sovereign State to prescribe and enforce laws, "within its own terri-
tory," without external interference, is embodied in the territorial ba-
sis of jurisdiction and is a fundamental tenet of international law.45
A sovereign is free to regulate the rights to property found within its
borders, limited only by general international law, and treaties it may
enter into with other sovereigns.46
When a sovereign has attempted to regulate rights in property
outside its territory through expropriation, United States courts have
been willing to enforce them only where it would not offend public
lic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976), where Justice White wrote that embarrassment to the Execu-
tive would be even more likely, "if we were to require that the repudiation of a foreign
government's debts arising from its operation of a purely commercial business be recognized as
an act of state and immunized from questions in our courts." Id. at 698.
42. This exception was endorsed by the Supreme Court in National City Bank v. Republic
of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1954). The justification for this exception was the belief that it would
be inequitable to allow a foreign plaintiff to bring a suit without permitting the courts to pro-
vide just results to all parties.
43. Comment, supra note 37, at 683-88.
44. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 416 (quoting Justice Fuller in Un-
derhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. at 252).
45. The supremacy of a nation within its borders was originally founded on the nineteenth
century view that, "the community of nations enjoyed the possession of so-called fundamental
rights, including ... territorial supremacy (sovereignty)." VON GLAHN, supra note 1, at 122.
46. Independence means that a state is free to manage its affairs without interference
(domestic independence), that is, that it can organize its government as it sees fit,
adopt a constitution to suit its own needs, lay down rules and regulations for the
property rights as well as the personal rights of its citizens and subjects, determine
under what specific conditions foreigners will enter its territory, and so on. In other
words, an independent state is "absolute master" in its own house, subject only to
such limitations as are imposed on it either by the rules of general international law or
by such treaty arrangements as it has made with other states. In essence, therefore,
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policy.47 As this Comment will document, such confiscation decrees
are rarely upheld because courts have consistently found the situs of
the intangible assets to be outside the confiscating country's territory.
Where the property a State seeks to confiscate is tangible, the
question of jurisdiction is one of fact and as such can be easily deter-
mined. The more difficult question arises when the property is intan-
gible, such as a bank asset or trademark right, and no physical
location exists."8 The location of the intangible assets represented by
the certificates of deposit in Garcia and Perez is central to determin-
ing the validity of the Cuban seizure. If it is possible to find that the
intangible property was not located in Cuba at the time of the confis-
cation and Cuba did not then have jurisdiction over the property,
United States courts would not be required to invoke the act of state
doctrine.49 Courts have addressed the problems of the act of state
doctrine and intangible assests in several forms. An examination of
several of these cases will illustrate how and why United States
courts have refused to honor certain expropriation decrees in the past
by manipulating the situs rule.
The question of intangibles and the application of the act of state
doctrine was raised most directly after Sabbatino in Republic of Iraq
v. First National City Bank.5° In that case the new government of
Iraq sought to confiscate assets of the estate of the late King Faisal II
that were held by a New York bank.5' Despite the fact that the King
resided in Iraq and died there during the 1958 revolution, the circuit
court refused to honor the confiscation decree because the bank had
possession of the assets in New York.52 As a result, Iraq did not
have the necessary jurisdiction to confiscate the assets.53
The important distinguishing feature between Republic of Iraq
and the Garcia and Perez decisions is the fact that the accounts were
held by Irving Trust Company in New York.54 Unlike Chase, Irving
Trust did not have a branch operating in the confiscating country at
47. See supra note 2.
48. See supra note 5.
49. The relevance of this issue was recognized most clearly by Wachtler, J. (dissenting) in
Perez where the opinion states that "the court must decide, as a matter of law, the threshold
question as to whether the intangible had its situs in the confiscating country." 61 N.Y.2d at
475, 463 N.E.2d at 12, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
50. 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965).
51. Id. at 50.
52. Id. at 51.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 49.
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the time of the decree." The majority in both Garcia and Perez con-
cluded that the presence of Chase offices in Cuba served to locate the
assets there and provide Cuba with jurisdiction.
5 6
The validity of that conclusion is brought into question by a se-
ries of decisions which found the situs of intangible assets outside the
confiscating country. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit addressed this problem in Tabacelera Severiano Jorge
S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co. 57 There the court held that the act of
state doctrine did not apply to preclude the pre-revolution managers
of Cuban companies from collecting for shipments made before the
Cuban revolution.58 The court reached that result by determining
the situs of the company's accounts receivable to be the United
States; hence, Cuba could not validly seize them.59 After noting the
shifting nature of intangibles, the court stated that no reason exists
for adopting the fiction that, "the situs is irrevocably at the domicile
of the creditor."'  The court then concluded the debt was not prop-
erty in Cuba.6 The court put the problem in perspective by observ-
ing that "[t]he situs of intangible property is about as intangible a
concept as is known to the law."
62
The issue was addressed in another Cuban nationalization case,
Menendez v. Saks & Company.63 Owners of expropriated Cuban ci-
gar companies brought an action against United States importers to
recover payments for certain cigar shipments. 6" Cuban government
interveners 65 had received some payments due the original owners
but claimed the money was owed for post-nationalization shipments.
The court found the United States to be the situs of the obligation to
55. Id. at 51.
56. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
57. 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1968).




62. Id. at 714. The distinguishing feature between Tabacelera Severino and the Garcia
and Perez decisions appears to be the characterization of the assets. In Garcia and Perez the
normal debt had its situs at the location of the debtor. In Tabacelera Severino the asset was
characterized as an account receivable which has as its situs the location of the creditor. As the
court indicated, no reason exists for adhering to these irrevocable rules. The same should be
true for situations similar to those in Garcia and Perez.
63. 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
64. Id. at 1360.
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pay the former owners and, therefore, the Cuban seizure of that por-
tion was ineffective.66 The court, in Menendez, reasoned that, "[flor
purposes of the act of state doctrine a debt is not located within a
foreign State unless that State has the power to enforce and collect
it."6 7 Since the parties owing the debts were the United States im-
porters, the court followed the reasoning of Republic of Iraq and
ruled that the confiscation was without legal effect.68
The court in Menendez, had applied the same rule used in
Tabacelera Servino, regarding accounts receivable. The result in
each case was that the situs was outside Cuba and unenforceable in
the United States.69 The court made it clear that, "[i]n the absence of
any showing that the importers or their agents were present in Cuba
or subject to the jurisdiction of Cuban courts at the time of the inter-
vention," the confiscation was ineffective.
70
The fact that courts consistently locate intangibles outside the
expropriating nation was illustrated with reference to the rights to a
trademark in Maltina Corporation v. Cawy Bottling Company.7' In
Maltina, the Cuban government expropriated a Cuban brewing cor-
poration and dissolved the business.7' The court determined that
these actions neither deprived the former owners of the right to make
an effective assignment of their United States registered trademark
nor cancelled the trademark.73 This conclusion was based on the de-
termination that "trademarks registered in this country have a local
identity-and situs-apart from the foreign manufacturer. '74
As the act of state doctrine has developed since Sabbatino,
66. Id. at 1364.
67. Id. at 1365.
68. Id. Two cases arising from the nationalization of jute mills by Bangladesh, United
Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic International, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), arid in part, re-
manded in part on other grounds, 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976); and Rapali Bank v. Provident
National Bank, 403 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1975) reinforced this view. In United Bank, the
products were received in the United States from East Pakistan in 1971. Before payment was
made the new nation of Bangladesh was created and both the banks and the jute mills were
nationalized. The district court concluded that the debt was located in New York at the time
of nationalization and, as such, was not subject to seizure by the new government. In Rapali
Bank, the district court held that Bangladesh lacked the necessary jurisdiction over the debt
since the established situs of the property was the United States.
69. 485 F.2d at 1365.
70. Id. In Garcia and Perez, Chase was still operating offices in Cuba at the time of the
confiscation and both courts indicated that was sufficient. See supra notes 14-16 and accompa-
nying text.
71. 462 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972).
72. Id. at 1023-24.
73. Id. at 1030.
74. Id. at 1026.
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courts have consistently found the situs of intangible assets to be
outside the confiscating sovereign's territory." Since Garcia and Pe-
rez appear to be the first times the application has resulted in giving
legal effect to confiscations,16 the time has come to reexamine its ba-
sis and examine alternatives.
IV. THE VIABILITY OF THE HARRIS V. BALK RULE
Where the rights to an intangible asset are embodied within a
document, the location of that document within the territory of a
nation has been held sufficient to establish jurisdiction.77 The rules
for determining jurisdiction in these cases are similar to those used
with other tangible personal property.78 The form of jurisdiction in-
volved with these nebulous assets is known in the United States as
either in rem or quasi in rem.79 The general rule for determining the
existence of jurisdiction involving intangibles is contained in the
Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. Balk."° Justice Peckham
stated, "[t]he obligation of the debtor clings to and accompanies him
wherever he goes."'" For numerous- reasons serious doubt has re-
cently been cast on the viability of this view and its use as a basis of
jurisdiction.
First, the Supreme Court and judicial precedent have not always
adhered to the Harris v. Balk rule. The Court has, at times, ignored
the rule when examining whether rights in intangibles may be altered
in a forum having adequate jurisdiction over the debtor. In New
York Life Insurance Company v. Dunlevy,8 2 an action to determine
75. Comment, supra note 37, at 683.
76. 61 N.Y.2d at 478, 463 N.E.2d at 13, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (Wachtler, J. dissenting).
Some would argue that Sabbatino was in fact the first recognition of such a confiscation. How-
ever, that case involved the expropriation of tangible property, sugar located in Cuba. 376 U.S.
at 403.
77. Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 1121, 1140 (1966). These intangibles include not only monetary assets but also pat-
ents, trademarks and other rights to income.
78. "The location within the jurisdiction of a document that embodies the right to intangi-
ble assets, for example, a negotiable instrument, has jurisdictional consequences similar to
those assigned to the presence of tangible chattels." Id.
79. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.15 (2d ed. 1977).
80. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). The case developed over $344 which Balk, a citizen of North
Carolina, owed Epstein, a citizen of Maryland. Harris, also a citizen of North Carolina, owed
Balk $180. While Harris was in Maryland, Epstein garnished the debt from Harris to Balk.
When Balk later sought payment in North Carolina Harris set up the Maryland judgment as a
defense. The Supreme Court held that the action in Maryland was valid and Harris was dis-
charged from his debt to Balk.
81. Id. at 222.
82. 241 U.S. 518 (1916). Mrs. Dunlevy brought suit against New York Life and her fa-
Vol. 16
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the validity of claims to an insurance policy, Pennsylvania courts
clearly had jurisdiction under the principles of Harris v. Balk. 3 De-
spite the presence of the insurance company/debtor within the state,
the Supreme Court ruled that only jurisdiction based on presence or
domicile would be allowable against Mrs. Dunlevy. s4 As a result, the
Pennsylvania court was without jurisdiction and their judgment was
not entitled to full faith and credit in other states' courts.8 5
Second, the Harris v. Balk rule does not accurately mirror fiscal
reality. The debt is a liability for the debtor, who possesses nothing
but a future obligation and, as a result, has little interest in, or con-
trol over, to whom it is paid. 6 The debt is a valuable asset, however,
to the creditor and it is there that concern for proceedings exist. The
creditor is bearing the risk of loss, and therefore has the correspond-
ing desire to protect it. The debtor's concern is limited since the obli-
gation is discharged whether it is paid to the creditor or the
sovereign.
Third, the Harris v. Balk rule creates a complicated and inequi-
table situation because the debt is payable and enforceable at any
bank branch throughout the world.8 7 The possibility of multiple si-
tuses has been acknowledged, but never strongly considered by the
courts."8 As a multinational corporation, Chase is located in
ther to recover $2,479.70 on a policy on his life. The case was brought in California state court,
removed to federal court, and judgment was for Mrs. Dunlevy. The judgment was affirmed by
the court of appeals. The insurance company had set up the defense of an earlier Pennsylvania
judgment. The Supreme Court held that California was not bound by the full faith and credit
clause to honor the Pennsylvania decision despite the presence of the debtor in Pennsylvania.
83. "Beyond doubt, . . . the Court of Common Pleas at Pittsburgh had ample power
through garnishment proceedings to inquire whether she had a valid claim against the insur-
ance company and if found ... to condemn and appropriate it .... Although herself outside
the limits of the state such dispositions of the property would be binding on her." Id. at 520.
84. Id.
85. Liberal interpleader laws particularly where insurance policies are involved may make
this specific result unlikely today; however, the principle remains. The inadequacy of the Har-
ris v. Balk view is still a concern.
86. Referring to tax problems, the Supreme Court stated: "[D]ebts owing by corpora-
tions, like debts owing by individuals are not property of the debtors in any sense; they are
obligations of the debtors, and only possess value in the hands of the creditors." Farmers Loan
Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 213 (1929) (quoting Railroad Company v. Pennsylvania, 82
U.S. (15 Wall.) 300, 320 (1872)).
87. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 235 (1982). "Under Harris v. Balk, a
garnishment process could be had wherever a garnishee could be found, if the local statute
permitted it." Id.
88. Although the Supreme Court accepted the idea of multiple situses in Curry v. McCan-
less, 307 U.S. 357 (1938), that case involved specific activities in both states and did not involve
the literally hundreds of locations around the world created in the present situation. It seems
inappropriate to use it as justification for establishing this inequitable result.
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thousands of places where it does business and is subject to actions
everywhere."9 This creates an unreasonable handicap on all deposi-
tors by making them subject to suit from Australia to Zaire and all
branches in between. The problem is avoided in the United States by
the full faith and credit provisions of the Constitution, because one
state is required to recognize the disposition of a debt undertaken in
another state. 90 That protection is not guaranteed by any enduring
legal limitation in international actions; the courts themselves are the
only source of protection.9' The decisions in Garcia and Perez placed
no limits on the ability of a nation to affect deposits at other branches
throughout the world. At an even greater extreme, no reason ap-
pears to preclude such actions even where the deposits were made
with a bank in the United States.
Fourth, it is important to keep in mind that Harris v. Balk dealt
only with a portion of the entire question of the ability to obtain
jurisdiction through attachment. 92 The Court was not addressing the
ability to confiscate property without a hearing or other objective ju-
dicial involvement. 93 In fact, there is little reason to believe courts
then or now would reach a conclusion with those results despite the
absolute language of the opinion.94 In applying the act of state doc-
trine, the Bernstein exception95 and the provisions of the Second
Hickenlooper Amendment96 allow an analysis of the propriety of the
89. It was the presence of an operating Chase branch in Cuba at the time of the confisca-
tion as well as the debts being payable there which provided the basis for Cuban jurisdiction.
The fact that this view would have allowed an action at any Chase office in any country is never
directly addressed by the opinions, except in Judge Watchler's dissent in Perez v. Chase Man-
hattan Bank, 61 N.Y.2d at 478, 463 N.E.2d at 13, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
90. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 87, at 235. "As long as full faith and credit is required to
the garnishment judgment, the garnishee is not in danger of having to pay twice." Id.
91. In the absence of this sort of constitutional proscription debtors could be subject to
liability more than once for the same debt.
92. Implicit in the Court's decision in Harris v. Balk were notions of "fair play and sub-
stantial justice" as the standard stated. This included, "the duty of the garnishee to give notice
to his creditor, if he would protect himself, so that the creditor may have the opportunity to
defend himself against the claim of the person suing out the attachment." 198 U.S. at 227.
93. Id.
94. "The question remains whether all relationships that would ground jurisdiction in an
action brought by the true defendant against his debtor are acceptable in a garnishment pro-
ceeding. The language of the decisions is often expansive ... but the point has little discussion
and apparently arises only rarely in litigation." Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 77, at
1140.
95. The Bernstein exception, discussed supra note 40, provides a mechanism for the Exec-
utive to determine whether the United States foreign policy interests would be endangered by a
judicial examination of the propriety of the nationalization. Where the taking is found to have
been improper the courts may provide relief.
96. The Second Hickenlooper Amendment, discussed supra note 39, prohibits courts from
Vol. 16
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nationalization. It would appear incongruous, then, to adopt an arbi-
trary rule of jurisdiction which strips those powers from the courts.
Fifth, the reliance on the Harris v. Balk rule for determining the
situs of intangible assets appears less certain following the Supreme
Court's decision in Shaffer v. Heitner.97 There, the Court held that
the presence of the intangible alone could not establish jurisdiction
and required the minimum contacts set out in International Shoe v.
Washington.98 The result of these decisions has been an extreme lim-
itation on the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction in the absence of some
form of personal jurisdiction over the parties involved.99 This retreat
from the traditional Harris v. Balk holding signals the same concerns
expressed previously, that a person be given an opportunity to defend
an action and not be subject to suit simply because the debtor is pres-
ent in a particular jurisdiction. Given the virtual abandonment of the
Harris v. Balk case after Shaffer, it seems inappropriate to allow the
simple presence of a Chase branch to establish the jurisdiction of a
foreign State and through it subject any depositor to action without
requiring contacts sufficient under the International Shoe rule."°
The Harris v. Balk rule is neither completely accepted nor uni-
formly applied.' Further, the decision has been eroded over the
last eighty years to a point where its application has become simply a
matter of personal choice.'0 2 The dissent in Garcia and the majority
in Perez both placed an unwarranted degree of weight on the Harris
invoking the act of state doctrine where the expropriation violated international law and the
President has not directed application of the doctrine.
97. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). This case involved a Delaware court's exercise of quasi in rem
jurisdiction based on a state law establishing the situs of shares of stock in the state where the
corporation is chartered. The Supreme Court held that the fictional situs of the stock in Dela-
ware alone was not sufficient to allow state jurisdiction in the absence of more personal
contacts.
98. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
99. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 87, at 237. Although the basic Shaffer decision was a
conclusion that shares of stock were unrelated to the cause of action and that it would then be
unjust to force a defendant to defend herself in a distant forum under threat of default, the
result has been an abandonment of the Harris v. Balk view that the situs of the intangible alone
creates jurisdiction.
100. Whether this would change the result in either Garcia or Perez is immaterial. Given
the absence of an attempt to assert personal jurisdiction the Cuban action should not be given
effect.
101. The continuing uncertainty regarding this form of jurisdiction was included in the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts where the authors state, "[i]t is uncertain,... whether all of
the other bases stated in section 27 for the exercise of personal jurisdiction will suffice for this
purpose." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAW § 68 comment c (1971).
102. Particularly in cases involving the act of state doctrine where policy considerations
play an important role in all decisions, it is unreasonable to conclude that the holdings have
created a consistent rule.
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v. Balk rule and have based critical policy decisions on infirm
ground.
V. ALTERNATIVES
To apply the act of state doctrine in expropriation cases, the
property must be located within the territory of the confiscating sov-
ereign. 10 3  In order to determine whether intangible property is
within certain territory it is necessary to resort to some legal fic-
tion. " The fiction the courts in Garcia and Perez use is represented
by Harris v. Balk. °5 The result is recognition of Cuban jurisdiction
and the confiscation of the assets.' 0 6 Given the basic policy nature of
the act of state doctrine, centering around the protection of United
States interests from arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
abroad,'07 the time has come to examine whether a more appropriate
rule/legal fiction exists for these situations. Toward that end this
section Will examine a standard presented in another Supreme Court
situs case and apply it to Harris v. Balk. Then this section will out-
line three alternatives to the rule and the advantages of each.
In Curry v. McCanless the United States Supreme Court pro-
vided a barometer for use in determining when jurisdiction over in-
tangibles should be recognized if alternative forums exist.'0 8 While
the Supreme Court recognized that complex issues may require aban-
donment of the old single situs view, "[rights relating to intangibles]
can be made effective only through control over and protection af-
forded to those persons whose relationships are the origin of the
rights."' 9 Concern for protection of these rights should be central to
the policy balance in determining whether the act of state doctrine
should be applied.
The Harris v. Balk rule, as used by the court in Perez, abandons
this concern for protection by deciding that the situs of certificates of
103. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
106. Id.
107. Courts are limited by their own need to maintain credibility. One author discussed
the problem in the context of First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S.
759 (1972). "Failure to provide meaningful compensation for the taking of Citibank's branches
may itself violate an international law duty; the point, however, is that the U.S. court's finding
a violation becomes less credible internationally as the facts slip away from the combination of
retaliation, discrimination and noncompensation." Kirgis, Act of State Exceptions and Choice
of Law, 44 COLO. L. REV. 173, 187 (1972).
108. 307 U.S. 357 (1938).
109. Id. at 366.
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deposit is any branch at which they can be redeemed. "0 This same
result would have occurred in Garcia in the absence of the express
promises on which the Second Circuit relied.'
As outlined previously, courts in earlier act of state doctrine
cases have always located intangibles in a single country. 1 2 None-
theless, the Perez and Garcia decisions leave the door open for a de-
positor to be subject to an action anywhere the bank operates.
Application of the Harris v. Balk rule therefore fails to meet the stan-
dard established in Curry.
A. Alternative I. Minimum Contacts
The first alternative is to use the minimum contacts test of Inter-
national Shoe.i"3 The traditional statement of the rule is that a party
must, "have certain minimum contacts with it (the forum) such that
the maintenance of suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' "' ' This test is more useful to the ex-
tent that it requires a reasonable connection between the parties suf-
fering the loss and the forum exercising jurisdiction."' By using
minimum contacts a person is unlikely to be subject to confiscation in
an unforseeable forum without warning. The test would also require
some connection between the forum and the claim in order to have
recognizable jurisdiction. The disadvantage of a minimum contacts
analysis would be that judges would be required to analyze a much
broader range of activities occurring outside the United States." 6
It appears unlikely that the minimum contacts analysis would
have altered the result in Garcia or Perez. The presence of Chase,
Manas, and Garcia in Cuba, and the fact that the transactions were
I10. The situs of the debtor creates jurisdiction wherever that party is found, despite the
interested party's lack of reasonable relation to the confiscating State.
11. The purpose of the agreement between Chase and Dominguez and Garcia was to
ensure that no matter what happened in Cuba, including seizure of the debt, Chase
would still have a contractual obligation to pay the depositors upon presentation of
their CDs .... Chase was aware of their desire to safeguard their money and assured
them that their funds would be protected.
Garcia, 735 F.2d at 650.
112. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
113. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
114. Id. at 316.
115. The rationale being that due process required that a court not exercise jurisdiction
where no relation existed between the court and the party whose rights were being affected. Id.
116. When this may involve an inquiry into factors which the court would find hard to
ascertain with certainty they would be forced to resort to simple speculation or decline jurisdic-
tion to be on the safe side. It was the Executive's superior fact finding ability which led to the
act of state doctrine in the first place. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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originally conducted in Cuba indicates that sufficient contacts ex-
isted. What the use of this test would have gained, however, was a
firmer basis for recognizing Cuban jurisdiction and more complete
protection for those whose interests were threatened." 7
B. Alternative I. Limiting to Seizures of Tangibles Only
The second alternative is outlined by Judge Wachtler in his dis-
sent in Perez."8 Judge Wachtler suggested that the act of state doc-
trine be applied only to the assets physically seized by the foreign
sovereign." 9 This determination would be made in the same manner
such issues are resolved in domestic disputes in which possession of a
document is all that is required. The advantage of this would be that
the legal fictions involved in determining the situs of intangibles
could be ignored. Instead, courts could focus their attention on the
assets actually seized and for which there is almost unanimous ac-
cord that the act of state doctrine should be applied.' 2 ° The disad-
vantage of this alternative would be the fact that it may ignore the
complex nature of modern financial transactions and severely limit
another nation's ability to police the activities of multinational corpo-
rations. The alternative is also likely to create situations where banks
would be subject to multiple liability.' 2 ' Utilizing this theory, both
Garcia and Perez would have recovered the amount of their certifi-
cates of deposit from Chase.
C. Alternative 111 Creditor's Presence
The final alternative is to base jurisdiction on the presence of the
creditor rather than the debtor. This view was adopted by the
Supreme Court for certain tax purposes in Farmers Loan Company v.
Minnesota.'22 The rule would operate in the same manner as the
traditional debtor rule, but the situs of intangibles would be based on
117. The goal is not to deny Cuban jurisdiction but to ensure that it will not be given effect
in the absence of just cause. The minimum contacts analysis guarantees that strong reasons
exist for respecting that exercise of jurisdiction.




121. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
122. 280 U.S. 204 (1930). The state of Minnesota sought to tax the transfer of certain
negotiable bonds and certificates of indebtedness it and its municipalities had issued. The
bonds and obligations had been held in New York by a domiciliary and passed under his will
which was probated there. The Court held the bonds and certificates had acquired permanent
situs for taxation in New York and the transfer was taxable there but not in Minnesota.
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where the creditor was found.' 2 3 This would be advantageous be-
cause, as discussed above, it is the creditor who has the strongest
interest in defending the suit or other action.'24 The result would be
a more complete airing of the issues and a correspondingly more in-
formed decision. The disadvantage of this alternative is that a mul-
tinational corporation that is a creditor may be subject to suit in
forums unconnected with the transaction in issue. This is not as bad
as Harris v. Balk, because the creditor continues to have an interest
in the outcome far greater than the debtor, no matter where it is
located.' 25
It is quite likely that this rule would not affect the outcomes in
Garcia and Perez either. This is because both Garcia and Manas
were in Cuba at the time of the confiscation or returned sometime
thereafter.' 26 The use of the creditor's location would still have pro-
duced a more acceptable decision because an action involving the
persons losing property in the transaction would have been required.
In that case the confiscation would seem more palatable to United
States courts.
Of the alternatives outlined, the best would be to base jurisdic-
tion on the presence of the creditor. It would provide consistency in
application, represent a realistic view of the complexity of modern
financial dealings, and ensure the party at risk the greatest chance of
access to any process which might be available. This view would also
serve to keep practice more in step with international law by requir-
ing a territorial basis of jurisdiction over the party losing property.
Finally, this alternative would best meet the standards of Curry by
maximizing the protection available against suits in distant, unrelated
forums.
CONCLUSION
The decision to apply the act of state doctrine in its present form
is based on policy considerations of what is best for the United
123. The mechanical aspect of determining where the creditor is located would be per-
formed in the same manner as presently done for debtors, i.e., domicile, principle place of
business, etc.
124. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
125. Where presence of the debtor is the sole basis of jurisdiction, the probability of an
enlightened decision remains limited by the likelihood that the creditor will, coincidentally,
also be in the area. This is because, without the creditor's involvement, the property is being
taken without an opportunity to defend against the action.
126. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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States.' 27 The sweep of the doctrine has been consistently narrowed
since its highwater mark in Sabbatino by a series of decisions seeking
more uniform and objective application. 28 Today, where judicial
consideration would not endanger the foreign policy interests of the
Executive, courts have used their own discretion in deciding such
cases. 129
The application of the traditional Harris v. Balk rule regarding
the situs of intangible assets produces inequitable results. 130 Given
the narrowing application of the act of state doctrine and the policy
goals which are the basis of the doctrine, it appears time to reexamine
the old intangible assets concepts.' 3 ' Thus, the traditional view that
an intangible debt has its situs wherever the debtor may be, when
used to determine application of the act of state doctrine, should be
abandoned.
132
Three alternatives exist which could be used to determine
whether an expropriation of intangibles occurred within a sovereign's
borders.133 The first is to use the minimum contacts analysis of In-
ternational Shoe. The second is to limit it to physical seizures only.
The third is to base the question on the ability to obtain some form of
jurisdiction over the creditor. 1"' Adopting the jurisdiction based on
the presence of the creditor would best serve the policy concerns of
the act of state doctrine by helping to protect United States interests
abroad while bringing the doctrine more in step with the current
state of jurisdictional law.
David L. Donnan
127. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
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